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RECENT DECISIONS
But even the liberal federal rules require that he be given notice by the
pleadings. 46
As the situation now stands in Ohio the plaintiff in a negligence action
must inform the defendant of the very acts upon which his case relies, and
yet the plaintiff has no right to be informed generally by the pleadings that
the defendant is going to assert the defense of contributory negligence.
One certain way to rectify the situation is for the legislature to require
the courts to restrict consideration by the jury of the evidence of the plain-
tiff's negligence under a denial to the issue of the plaintiff's sole negligence.
M. KmENm THORNTON
RICHARD C. OGLINE
Recent Decisions
FALSE ADVERTISING - FAILURE TO REVEAL MATERIAL FACTS
Can the Federal Trade Commission order an advertiser to inform the
public that more often than not his product is worthless? In effect, that
was the novel question with which the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia was confronted in a recent case.' An advertiser
was charged with having represented that "Oxorin Tablets" would have
a beneficial therapeutic effect upon the reader if he were "tired," "weary,"
or "run down." The Commission found that the pills had no such bene-
ficial effect unless the conditions described were due to simple iron de-
ficiency anemia, and that more often than not such conditions were the
result of causes other than simple iron deficiency anemia. The Commis-
sion ordered the advertiser to cease and desist from representing that
"Oxorin Tablets" would have any beneficial effects upon the conditions of
lassitude described unless such conditions were caused by simple iron de-
ficiency anemia, and unless he revealed that more often than not these
conditions were the result of causes other than simple iron deficiency
anemia.2 The Court of Appeals held that a failure to reveal that the condi-
tions of lassitude described were less frequently the result of simple iron
deficiency anemia than of other causes was not a "false advertisement" as
defined by Section 15a of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The order
was modified by strikang the portion requiring that revelation, and affirmed
'a FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (c).
1 Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. demned, 71 Sup. Ct. 49 (1950).
-FTC v. Alberty, 44 F. T. C. 475,517 (1948). Similar orders were issued by the
Commission in FTC v. Market Drug Co., 44 F. T. C. 721 (1948) (order la); FTC
v. Sunway Vitamin Co., 44 F. T. C. 708 (1948) (order la); FTC v. American
Dietads, 44 F. T. C. 667 (1948) (order lb).
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as modified.' One judge dissented, contending that the order should have
been affirmed n toto.
In 1938 Congress amended the Federal Trade Commission Act by
enacting the Wheeler-Lea Act.' The dissemination of false and misleading
advertising of food, drugs and cosmetics was declared to be unlawful.5 The
Federal Trade Commission was empowered to prevent such advertising as
being an "unfair and deceptive act and practice in commerce."" The stat-
ute also provided a definition of false advertuslng.T
This definition was intended to be very broad.8 The common law ele-
ments of sczenter and reliance were not included as necessary elements of
the statutory offense,9 for the purpose of the act was not the punishment of
'The court also found that a failure to reveal that the advertiser's product was recog-
nized as having value only by the homeopathic school of medicine was not a "false
advertisement." It is doubtful that the Commission's order required this revela-
tion. See FTC v. Alberty, 44 FTC 475, 519 (1948) (order 1k)
'38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 41 (1934), as amended, 52 STAT. 111
(1938), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 41 (1946) Hereinafter referred to as the Federal Trade
Commission Act. For an analysis of the Wheeler-Lea Act see Note, 86 UNiv. OF
PA. L. REV. 757 (1938) For a discussion of the decision in FTC v. Raladam, 283
U.S. 643, 51 Sup. Ct. 587 (1931), which was at least partly responsible for the
need of the Amendment, see Handler, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Over False Advertising, 31 CoL. L. REv. 527 (1931). See also Kelley and
Cassedy, The Federal Trade Commission Act as Amended by the Wheeler-Lea Act,
2 FOOD DRUG CosMETIc L.Q. 315 (1947)
'Federal Trade Commission Act § 12a. The demand for this legislation came not
only from the public, but from honest manufacturers and advertisers as well. H.R.
REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st. Sess. 23 (1937). For a history of the Commis-
sion's attempts to regulate the advertising of food, drugs and cosmetics, see Cassedy,
False Advertisement of Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics, 4 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L Q.
353 (1949)
'Federal Trade Commission Act Sec. 12b.
71d. § 15a. "The term 'false advertisement' means an advertisement, other than
labeling, which is misleading in a material respect; and in determining whether any
advertisement is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things)
not only representations made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, sound,
or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the advertisement fails to
reveal facts material in the light of such representations or material with respect to
consequences which may result from the use of the commodity to which the adver-
tisement relates. "
'The definition is broad enough to cover every form of advertisement deception
over which it would be humanly practicable to exercise governmental control. It
covers every case of imposition on a purchaser for which there could be a practical
remedy. It reaches every case from that of inadvertent or uninformed advertising
to that of the most subtle as well as the most vicious types of advertisement." H.R.
REP., supra note 5, at 5.
'Ibid. "To the duped customer, the state of mind of the advertiser at the time the
misrepresentation was made is of no consequence. It is not the advertiser's sub-
jective intent or knowledge but the fact that his wares are not as represented that
causes harm." Handler, The Control of False Advertising Under the Wheeler-Lea
Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 91 (1939). Mr. Handler's fear that the phrase
'misleading in a material respect' might be interpreted by the courts as a require-
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a wrongdoer or the protection of the individual, but the protection of
the public generally. 0 Thus, it need not be shown that the consumer has
actually been deceived by the representation, but only that it has the
capacity or tendency to deceive or mislead." Nor need the representation
be actually false, for techmcally correct grammatical construction will not
save.a representation from being misleading if the public would be likely
to misunderstand it 12
In deciding whether a representation is misleading in a material respect,
the criterion is not whether it would be misleading to an expert, or a reason-
able man, but whether it would mislead a substantial part of the consuming
publiC3
Section 15a of the Federal Trade Commission Act declares that in de-
termimng whether a representation is misleading the Commission may con-
sider" the extent to which the advertisement fails to reveal facts material
in the light of such representations or material with respect to consequences
which may result from the use of the commodity "14 Since it can be
determined with some degree of accuracy whether harmful consequences
may result from the use of a commodity, there. is little difficulty in applying
the latter part of this test. Thus, false advertising may be constituted by a
failure to reveal that excessive exposure to an ultra-violet lamp may be
dangerous to certain skin diseases,'5 that a preparation for delayed menstrua-
tion may cause serious gastro-intestnal disturbances, 0 or that an obesity
cure may result in serious and irreparable injury to the health of the user.'7
'What constitutes a failure "to reveal facts material in the light of such
representations" is not so clear. Most of the controversy in this area has
centered around the question of whether it is misleading not to reveal
that a preparation will afford only temporary relief to a certain condition.'8
ment of reliance, have not been realized. For a discussion of the remedies against
false and misleading advertising at common law, see Handler, False and Misleading
Advertising, 39 YALE L. J. 22 (1929).
"
0Belmont Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 103 F.2d 538 (3rd Cir. 1939).
' Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2nd Cir. 1944).
'D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1942). "The statutory ban applies
to that which is suggested as well as that which is asserted." Handler, The Control
of False Advertmssng Under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 6 LAw & CoNThMP. PROB. 91 at
102 (1939).
"Advertisements must be considered in their entirety, and as they would be read
by those to whom they appeal." Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165,167 (7th Cir.
1942).
1 See note 7 supra.
Ultra-Violet Products, Inc. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1944).18Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cit. 1942)
17American Medicinal Products v. FTC, 136 F.2d 426 (9th Cit. 1943).
" It has been held by implication that a failure to reveal that a preparation would
afford only temporary relief for the symptom of itching was not misleading. D.D.D.
1950]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
It would be inpossible to deduce any general rule from the few decisions
pertaining to "temporary relief."
The decision in the Alberty case has limited that which constitutes a
failure "to reveal facts material in the light of such representation." The
decision, however, seems to be based more on an inability to grasp the
facts involved rather than on any notions as to the extent of the law or
reasons of public policy."" The court's confusion is adequately illustrated
by the statement that " the Commission goes far across the line when it
attempts to require an advertiser of a drug admittedly beneficial in one
ailment to state affirmatively that there are other ailments not reached by
the drug."20 This statement, if made in relation to a set of facts such as
those implied, would undoubtedly be valid, but the fact is that the Com-
mission made no such attempt. The Commission merely found that an
advertisement that described the conditions of lassitude accompanying
simple iron deficiency anemia but failed to reveal that the same conditions
were caused by other ailments which the "Oxorin Tablets" would not
benefit, would be misleading to the consuming public. 2' The Commis-
sion's order left the advertiser free to state that his preparation would
remedy simple iron deficiency anemia, but if he chose to describe the condi-
tions accompanying that ailment, he was required to make further revela-
tions.
Although the court was undoubtedly influenced by the affirmative
aspect of the order, the decision in the Alberty case cannot be construed to
prohibit affirmative orders where the facts not revealed are material because
of the representations made. The power to make affirmative orders as to
the consequences of a preparation has repeatedly been upheld.2 2 The defi-
Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1942). An opposite result was reached
where the court found that the advertiser had impliedly represented that his prepara-
tion would give permanent relief to dandruff. Sebrone v. FTC, 135 F.2d 676 (7th
Cir. 1943) In another case the court went so far as to sanction a finding by the
Commission that a failure to reveal that the advertiser's hair preparation would
not color hair to which it was not applied (that is which had not yet grown out)
was misleading. Gelb v. FTC, 144 F.2d 580 (2nd Cir. 1944)
"In FTC v. American Dietads Co., 44 F. T. C. 667 at 707 (1948), Commissioner
Mason objected to such an order as is here under discussion on grounds of policy.
"Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 39-40 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 71 Sup. Ct. 49
(1950)
' "It decided that the Commission goes too far when its order 'requires that the ad-
vertiser tell the public that his product is more frequently valueless than it is val-
uable.' I do not find that a startling requirement when its function is to rebut a
false or misleading inference that the product is more frequently valuable than it
is valueless." Bazelon, J., dissenting in Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36,45 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied. 71 Sup. Ct. 49 (1950)
= "The order does not require petitioners to reveal anything. It requires them to
cease and desist from disseminating false advertisements, particularly those described
in the order, but does not require them to advertise at all. If petitioners do not
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